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RECENT CASES
COMMERCE-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-BAR MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE VIO-
LATES SHERMAN ACT.
In 1971, Ruth and Lewis Goldfarb attempted to find a lawyer in
Fairfax County, Virginia, who would conduct a title examination
for a home they wished to purchase, for less than the price sugges-
ted in the minimum fee schedule of the Fairfax County Bar Asso-
ciation.' When they were unsuccessful in finding any attorney who
would examine the title for less than the suggested price, the Gold-
farbs brought a class action suit in federal district court 2 against
the County Bar Association and the State Bar Association 3 for in-
junctive relief and damages, alleging that the minimum fee sched-
ule violated Section One of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.4 The dis-
trict court, after trial on the issue of liability alone, held that the
minimum fee schedule was a form of price fixing and therefore-was
an anti-competitive activity in violation of the Sherman Act. 5 The
court held, however, that the actions of the State Bar Association
were exempt from the Act 6 because the State Bar Association was
an administrative agency of the Virginia Supreme Court,7  and
therefore, its actions were exempt under the "state action" exemp-
1. The recommended fee for a title examination on the Minimum Fee Schedule of tne
Fairfax Bar Association was practically identical to that suggested by the Virginia State
Bar In 1969. In its Minimum Fee Schedule Report, the State Bar recommended a fee of
one percent (1%) of the first $50,000.00 of the amount of the loan or purchase price and
% of one percent (.5%) of the loan amount or purchase price from $50,000.00-to $250,000.00.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 499 (E.D. Va. 1973).
2. Id. at 491.
3. Two other defendants, the Alexandria Bar Association and the Arlington County
Bar Association agreed to enter into consent judgments under which they were ordered
to cancel their existing minimum fee schedules and were enjoined from publishing or
distributing any future schedules of minimum or suggested fees. Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 n.7 (1975).
4. Ch. 647, 69 Stat. 282. Section One of the Sherman Act provides In part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal...
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
5. 355 F. Supp. at 496.
6. Id.
7. The district court based its decision that the State Bar Association was an admin-
istrative agency of the Virginia Supreme Court on VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974 Repl. Vol.),
which provides:
The Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and
amend rules and regulations organizing and governing the association known
as the Virginia State Bar, composed of attorneys-at-law of this State, to
act as an administrative agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating
and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted by
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tion from the Sherman Act established in Parker v. Brown.8 The
adoption of the schedule by the County Bar Association, however,
was found to be a purely private undertaking and thus its activities
were not exempt from the Act.9 The court of appeals, while recog-
nizing that the minimum fee schedule and its method of enforce-
ment substantially restrained the competition among attorneys,
nevertheless reversed as to the liability of the Fairfax County Bar
Association. 10 The court discussed a "learned profession" exemp-
tion" to the Sherman Act, and held that the practice of law, being
a "learned profession," is neither trade nor commerce within the
meaning of the Act.'
2
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was
reversed, the Court holding: (1) that the schedule and its enforce-
ment mechanism constituted price fixing because, in fact, there
was a fixed and rigid price level set; (2) that a significant amount
of funds for home loans came from outside the state and that a title
examination was an essential part of these interstate transactions
so that interstate commerce was sufficiently affected; (3) that Con-
gress never intended any broad "learned profession" exemption
from the Sherman Act; and (4) that the activities of the State Bar
Association were not exempt as state action because they were not
"compelled" by the sovereign state, but were, in effect,- a private
anti-competitive activity. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975).
Not all restraints on trade are violative of the Act,, but only
those that unduly restrain interstate commerce.13 Since Standard
the Court under this article for such proceedings as may be necessary, and
requiring all persons practicing law in this State to be members thereof in
good standing.
8. 817 U.S. 341 (1943). This case held that the Sherman Act was never intended to
apply to state action.
9. 355 F. Supp. at 495.
10. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 20 (4th Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 13. The court stated:
Throughout the development of federal anti-trust law there has been
judicial recognition of a limited exclusion of "learned professions" from the
scope of the anti-trust laws. This exclusion is not a favor bestowed upon pro-
fessionals by the courts as a "professional courtesy"; the exclusion arises
from the language of the statutes and the peculiar nature of the services
rendered.
12. Id. at 14. The court stated:
In view of the special form of regulation already imposed upon those in the
legal profession the courts have been reluctant to super-impose upon the pro-
fession the sanctions of the antitrust laws, many of which are In direct con-
travention of existing legal and ethical restrictions.
In addition, the court of appeals decided that there was no Jurisdiction over the
activity of title examinations because that service was local in character and did not
have the required effect on interstate commerce to give the district court jurisdiction.
Id. at 18.' This decision was made in spite of the fact that a considerable portion of the
money for mortgages for home loans in Fairfax County came from out of state. Further-
more, the United States Veterans Administration and the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development guaranteed over $128 million in home loans In the county
in fiscal year 1972. See 355 F. Supp. at 497.
13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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Oil Co. v. United States,14 there have developed two theories which
are used in determining if a restraint is undue or not, the "rule of
reason" theory and the "per se" theory.'5
The "rule of reason" theory was first articulated in Standard
Oil.' 'Jnder this-approach the Court takes a broad look at the re-
•straint to see if it, in fact, restrains trade. The purposes and cir-
cumstances behind the restraint become important. Courts will nor-
mally not find an antitrust violation except in those cases where
the "public interest is unreasonably prejudiced.
'1 7
In Goldfarb, the Court appears to have applied the rule of rea-
son approach to the minimum fee schedule at issue. The Court
looked at the effect of the schedule as the most important element
in its decision. 8 Before authorizing a real estate mortgage, exam-
ination of title was made a prerequisite by the lenders.19 Only li-
censed attorneys could, by law, perform this service. The minimum
fee schedule, it was found, set the price for the service, and com-
pliance with the schedule was enforced by the threat of discipline
from the State Bar Association. 20 The Court noted that "a naked
agreement was .clearly shown-and the effect on prices is plain. ' ' 2
Section One of the Sherman Act 22 applies only where the con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy is in restraint of "interstate" or
"foreign" trade or commerce.22 The district court, in the case at
bar, found that because a significant amount of funds for home
loans was furnished by out of.state lenders, and because these len-
ders required an examination of the title as a condition precedent
14. Id.
15. Note, The Antitrust Division v. The Professions-"No Bidding" Clauses and Pee
Schedules, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 966, 970 (1973). Under the "per se" approach, once it
is established that there has been an agreement to fix prices in restraint of interstate
commerce, the court looks no further. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
892, 401 (1927). The Court applied the "per se" theory in United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 495 (1950). The complaint in that case charged that
members of the Washington Board had conspired to fix commission rates for their services
a brokers. The Board had adopted standard rates of commissions for its members and
had a code of ethics stating that rates should not be charged that were lower than those
set. The Court held that a worthy purpose on the part of the Board made no difference
since price fixing was "per se" an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 489.
16. 221 U.S. at 60.
17. Comment, Mininurm Fee Schedules v. Antitrust: The Goldfarb Affair, 45 Miss. LI.
162, 164 (1974).
18. 421 U.S. at 781.
19. 355 F. Supp. at 494.
20. 421 U.S. at 777-78. The Court stated:
The most recent opinion [referring to the Virginia State Bar Committee on
Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 170, May 28, 1971] states that "evidence that an
attorney habitually charges less than the suggested minimum fee schedule
adopted by his local bar association raises a presumption that such lawyer
is guilty of misconduct.
21. Id. at 782.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
23. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940). See generally J. VAN CISE,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 7 (1962).
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for each loan, interstate commerce was sufficiently affected to give
the court jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. 24
The Supreme Court in dealing with this question reached a sim-
ilar conclusion, finding that a title examination was "an intergral
part of an interstate transaction." 25 The ",substantiality" of the
commerce and the "inseparability" of the legal service from the
"interstate aspects of real estate transaction" was enough to have
the requisite effect on interstate commerce to give federal courts
jurisdiction over the activity.2 6
In discussing the "learned profession" exemption2 7 and its ap-
plicability to the County Bar Association, the court of appeals had
reasoned that the Sherman Act was directed to trade or commerce;
since the practice of law was neither trade nor commerce, the ac-
tivities of the County Bar Association which restrained competition
among attorneys were exempt from the Act. 28 The court noted that
the special ethical standards, of a profession would be subject to
serious erosion if it were expected to conduct itself -in the same
manner as the normal business community. 2
9
In declining to accept the court of appeals' characterization of
the legal profession as exempt from the Act, the Supreme Court at-
tacked the precedents relied upon by the County Bar Association
as showing the existence 'of a "learned profession" exemption, and
declared that any language in its decisions which implied such an
exemption until the time of Goldfarb was purely dicta. The Court
declared that it had never decided whether the practice of a learned
profession fell within Section One of the Sherman Act. 0
In Federal Baseball Club v. National League,31 the Court held
that the profession of baseball was exempt from the Sherman Act
because it involved personal effort not related to production, and
therefore was not a subject of commerce . 2 In a later case, Rado-
vich v. National Football League,2 a professional football player
24. 355 F. Supp. at 494. The court of appeals disagreed, holding the practice of law
was basically an intrastate activity. It felt that the mere coincidence of providing a legal
service for a borrower who was getting his money out of state was not enough to make
those services an interstate activity. 497 F.2d at 17. The court maintained that in this
case any restraint caused by the fee schedule was too incidental or remote from inter-
state commerce to grant jurisdiction. The court of appeals decision has been aptly criti-
cized. See Recent Development, Minimum Fee Schedules-The Battle and The War: Gold-
farb at the Fourth Circuit, 60 VA. L. REv. 1415 (1974).
25. 421 U.S. at 784.
26. Id. at 785. The Court added, however, that not all legal services would necessarily
have this connection with interstate commerce and therefore those services would be be-
yond the reach of the Sherman Act.
27. See note 11 supra.
28. 497 F.2d at 13-15. For a discussion In support of a professional exemption, see Note,
Goldfarb Fights the Bar, 27 Sw. L.J. 524 (1973).
29. 497 F.2d at 14.
90. 421 U.S. at 786 n.15.
81. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
32. Id. at 209.
33. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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brought an action under the antitrust laws alleging a conspiracy
by the league to monopolize and control organized football. Al-
though it did not overturn Federal Baseball Club, the Court declar-
ed that it would limit baseball's exemption to that sport alone, and
implied that if the baseball case were brought before it today, the
result would be different.
4
In Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 35 a case involv-
ing an unfair competition charge brought by the Federal Trade Com-
mission against a manufacturer of obesity cures, the Court noted
in dicta that medical practitioners "follow a profession and not a
trade.' 3 6 However, in American Medical Association v. United
States,37 the Supreme Court refused to decide if the medical pro-
fession was a trade under Section Three of the Sherman Act. 38
On the basis of these decisions, the Court concluded in the pre-
sent case that it was free, unrestrained by stare decisis, to deter-
mine whether the activity of the legal profession in this case fell
within the scope of the Act. The Court felt that there was no way to
avoid the fact that examination of a land title was a service and
that an exchange of money for such a service was commerce un-
der the Sherman Act.3 9 The Court was careful to limit its decision,
however, by stating that it would be unrealistic to apply antitrust
concepts, applicable to the business community as a whole, to all
aspects of professional activities. Situations might arise, the Court
noted, in which a certain restraint, practiced by one not engaged in
a profession, might be violative of the Sherman Act, while the same
activity, if carried on in a profession, might not violate the Act.
4 0
The Virginia State Bar Association had argued successfully at
both lower court levels that the Sherman Act did not apply to its
activities concerning minimum fee schedules because they were ex-
empt as state action under Parker v. Brown.41 Under the state
action doctrine, immunity from the antitrust laws is said to exist
where the state itself engages in anti-competitive activities or com-
34. Id. at 452. The Court stated:
If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to
answer, . . . that were we considering the question of baseball for the first
time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts. But Federal Baseball held
the business of baseball outside the scope of the Act. No other business
claiming such coverage of those cases has such an adjudication. We, there-
fore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if
any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision.
35. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
36. Id. at 658.
87. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
38. Id. at 528. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) Is similar to Section One of the Act, but applies
to territories of the United States and the District of Columbia.
39. 421 U.S. at 787.
40. Id. at 787 n.17.
41. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See note 8 supra.
W8
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mands private parties to engage in such activities. 42 In Parker, a
producer and packer of raisins in California brought suit to enjoin
state officials from enforcing the California Agricultural Prorate
Act 4 3 against him. The Prorate Act implemented a raisin market-
ing program designed to stabilize the sagging raisin industry. The
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was never intended to
restrain legitimate state action, 44  and thus refused to enjoin en-
forcement of the state agricultural proration program.
The State Bar Association in Goldfarb argued that its minimum
schedule was in essence state action, because the Virginia state leg-
islature had authorized the state supreme court to regulate the
practice of law, 45 and that the implementation of fee schedules was
authorized by the fee provisions of the established ethical codes.46
The Supreme Court, however, decided that if an activity is to be
exempt from antitrust laws under the state action doctrine of Parker
42. Recent Development, Minimum Fee Schedules-The Battle and the War: Goldfarb at
the Fourth Circuit, 60 VA. L. REV. 1415, 1417 (1974).
43. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754 [1933] STAT. OF CAL. 1909, as amended by ch. 471 and
743 [1935] 1526, 2087, ch. 6 [1938] Extra Session 39, chs. 963, 548, and 894 [1939] 1702,
1947, 2485, and chs. 603, 1150, and 1186 [1941] 2050, 2858, 2943.
44. 317 U.S. at 350-51. The Court concluded:
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never intended to oper-
ate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its authority
and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state'and was not In-
tended to operate or become effective without that command. We find nothing
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities di-
rected by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under
the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may consti-
tutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify
a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed
to Congress.
For a detailed discussion of the "state immunity" doctrine, see Teply, Antitrust
Immunity o1 State and Local Government Action, 48 TUL. L. REv. 273 (1974).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (1974 Repl. Vol.) provides:
Rules and regulations defining practice of law prescribing procedure for
practice by law students, codes of ethics, and disciplinary procedure,-The
Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and
amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(al) Prescribing procedure for limited practice by law by third-year law stu-
dents.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attor-
neys-at-law or patent law through professional law corporations, professional
associations, and partnerships, and a code of judicial ethics.
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring at-
torneys-at-law.
46. Canon 12 of the Canons of Ethics and EC 2-18 of the VIRGINIA CODE 0F PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY promulgated by the Virginia Supreme Court can be found in 355 F. Supp.
at 499-500. Canon 12 includes, as one relevant consideration in determining the proper
fee to charge, the customary charges of the bar for similar circumstances. However, it
also states:
In determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar services, It is
proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees 9idopted by a
Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby
or to follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
[emphasis added]. And In EC 2-18 of the VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI3ILITY:
Suggested fee schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associa-
tions provide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees.
[emphasis added].
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v. Brown 47 it must be "required" and "compel-led" by the state,
acting as sovereign.4 8 The Court concluded that the minimum fee
schedules in Virginia were nct required or compelled. Thus, the
Court, while reaffirming the "state action" exemption to. the Sher-
man Act, found that the State Bar Association had "voluntarily
joined" in a "private anti-competitive activity," and that therefore
the Sherman Act was applicable to its actions.4
9
There has been a plethora of literature debating the pros and cons
of fee schedules:9 One of the most common reasons given in sup-
port of schedules is, that uniformity of prices is desirable to pre-
vent "shopping" and uncontrolled price competition which would
degrade the practice of law.51 A common complaint against fee
schedules is that they often provide for highly unreasonable fees.52
The Executive Committee of the North Dakota State Bar Associa-
tion, although recognizing that fee schedules had some favorable
aspects, abolished the state's Advisory Fee Schedule totally in Nov-
ember, 1973, in response to the first Goldfarb decision.5 3
47. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
48. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
49. Id. at 792.
50. See, e.g., Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.S. 655
(1971); Miller & Veil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972);
Morgan, Where Do We Go from Here with Fee Schedules? 59 A.B.A.J. 1403 (1973) ; Note,
A Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARv. L. REv. 971
(1972).
51. Arnould & Corley, supra note 50, at 656. Other reasons in support of schedules given
by the authors are: (1) to provide the proper tools and a satisfactory standard of living
for lawyers; (2) to assist the public in determining what is considered a reasonable fee;
(3) to assist the judiciary in determining what is a reasonable fee; (4) to assist lawyers
and particularly the young practitioners In determining the value of their services; and
(5) to provide for differences in competition among attorneys by fixing a fee for reason-
able competency in the performance of designated services.
52. Id. at 657-62. Other reasons given in opposition to schedules are: (1) the-differences
between fee schedules cannot be justified by differing economic conditions; (2) fee sched-
ules are not based on "time" as they purport to be; (3) they are inconsistent with the
professional status of lawyers; (4) the existence of fee schedules is not supported by
their use; and (5) possible antitrust violations.
In view of the Goldfarb decision, of course, the last reason will, no doubt, be com-
pelling in almost all cases where the value of a bar keeping its fee-schedule is being con-
sidered. There might, however, be the possibility of having a schedule which would not
violate the antitrust laws. Whether a bar association would want to run this risk would
be another matter.
53. The Gavel, Dec., 1973 at 2, col. 1 (published by State Ba Ass'n of N.D.). Alan
Warcup, President of the State Bar Association of North Dakota at that time, stated:
The Executve Committee in the November meeting. . . . voted to rescind the
Advisory Fee Schedule in accordance with my recommendation. This action
was not taken without a great deal of thought and has been considered by
the Committee for almost a year. . . . We have received comments from
some of the members, both for and against the action taken by the Execu-
tive Committee. . . . However, it appears that the time has come to make
a decision and the decision of the Executive Committee was to rescind.
In June, 1970, the North Dakota State Bar Association had published the Advisory
Fee Schedule which had been prepared by the Legal Economics Committee of the State
Bar. This schedule was to supersede the Minimum Fee Schedule (First Revision) which
had been adopted on June 25, 1965. The 1970 Fee Schedule made it clear that it was to
be an "advisory," and not a "minimum" schedule.
The schedule was based on the unit system with each unit equal to $10.00, and
a particular service listed as so many suggested units. For example, the suggested value
for an examination of title for real estate was listed as four (4) units. One unit was to
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Goldfarb may have possible repercussions in other areas in
which competition among lawyers has been restrained, such as the
traditional ban on advertising, 54 or the restrictions, placed on the
use of credit card plans.5" Such a development might not have as
big an impact in North Dakota, because of its small population
and many single-lawyer communities, as it would in other more pop-
ulous states where the competition among attorneys might be more
keen. Nevertheless, with the increasing number of young lawyers
entering the job market each year, demands for less stringent bar
regulations on competitive activities can be expected to increase.
However, it should be noted that despite its decision, the Court in
Goldfarb did recognize that the states continue to have a. "compel-
ling interest" in regulating the practice of professions. 56
Even under the Goldfarb decision, reasonable fee schedules
might be developed through means which are outside the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws. For example, statistical averaging of
fees actually charged might be used as a guideline. This informa-
tion would simply be historical data, and thus presumably would es-
cape many of the pitfalls encountered in Goldfarb. Additionally, a
commission might be organized which would inquire into what real-
ly are "reasonable fees."
57
Much of the real worth of fee schedules is directed towards the
young, sole practitioner who genuinely needs, some guidance in set-
ting his fees. In a rural state like North Dakota, with its many
single lawyer communities, a young attorney on his own needs to
know the reasonable value for his services. Doing away with fee
schedules will not, of course, eliminate excessive charges for rou-
tine tasks which are all too often the "gravy" of the practicing at-
torney. But at least those charges will not be made under the guise
of institutionalized, ethical authorization.
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be added to each additional $10,000.00 or fraction thereof over $25,000.00. Many of the
rationales for fee schedules were given, such as contributing to the public welfare by at-
tracting and keeping high caliber men in the profession.
54. See Morgan, supra note 50, at 1404. On February 17, 1976, the ABA authorized at-
torneys to advertise limited information about services and fees in telephone book Yellow
Pages and in certain ABA-approved publications. The Washington Post, Feb. 18, 1976, at
1, col. 8. The ethical code change permits the advertising of office hours, legal education,
credit terms and field of concentration. Id. at 8, col. 8.
55. ABA Opinion Nd. 338 (1974). The use of credit cards for payment of legal services
Is authorized by the committee, but subject to severe restraints. For example, all publicity
or advertising relating to any credit card plan has to have the prior approval of the proper
bar committee having jurisdiction over the ethical conduct of the lawyers concerned.
56. 421 U.S. at 792. The interests of the state in regulating lawyers, specifically, was
recognized as "especially great."
57. Morgan, supra note 50. at 1405.
